Hollywood Creative Accounting: The Success Rate of Major Motion Pictures

Abstract:

Academic, trade, and popular publications commonly assert that 80 percent of motion pictures fail to make a net profit, suggesting also that the main players of the motion picture industry operate in highly volatile market conditions. More importantly, major film companies use this argument to negotiate for better terms with their production and distribution partners, to lobby for stricter copyright protections, and to argue in favor of media conglomeration as a hedge against adverse market conditions. This article disputes these assertions by calculating the full range of income that major motion pictures derive from their primary and secondary markets. It demonstrates that a large share of studio films are ultimately profitable, therefore challenging the arguments that conglomerates make with industry partners and government policy makers.[2]

Keywords: Film, Distribution, Marketing, Hollywood, Conglomeration

The business of filmmaking in Hollywood radically changed following the controversial release of Michael Cimino’s Heaven’s Gate (1980), whose financial losses so weakened its producer-distributor United Artists that it was soon after taken over by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM).[3] As a distributor, United Artists embodied an approach to filmmaking that had become “emblematic of the art in the 1970s, based on prizing the independence of directors and glorifying artistic innovation.”[4] Therefore, the demise of United Artists led the way to an alternative approach to filmmaking, one more focused on commercial goals. Distributors belonging to the largest info-entertainment conglomerates (here, “the major distributors” or “majors”) shaped the principles of the new business strategy, which involved large investments in films designed to generate important revenues from emerging and rapidly growing secondary markets, including retail video sales and rentals, pay-per-view cable channels, and digital downloads.[5] In more recent years, the exploitation of intellectual property (e.g., characters, images, and scores) in ancillary markets (e.g., books, music CDs and digital downloads, video games, theme parks, fast food restaurants and various other merchandising items) also became an important element of this strategy.[6] As a result, distribution became the “art of maximizing consumption and corresponding revenues across exploitation options,"[7] and film distributors took on more and more important roles within the increasingly vertically integrated value chains of media conglomerates.[8]

Although the strategy of the majors has been changing quite radically since the 1980s, analyses of the profitability or the success rates of motion pictures produced by these companies seems to be largely lacking. On the contrary, the existing body of literature describes the film business as characterized by regular commercial failures and a few very fortunate successes. For example, in 1998, Weinstein bemoaned that only 10 to 20 percent of film projects were reporting net profits.[9] In 2008, the United Nations echoed these estimates, saying “it was widely recognized” that only 20 percent of movies made a profit.[10] In making these assertions the aforementioned articles failed to cite any empirical studies, but in 2004 De Vany and Walls confirmed these estimates after studying a large sample of films released between 1984 and 1996. They concluded that about 78 percent of these movies lost money and only 22 percent were profitable.[11]

Many scholars of media policy and economics are likely to have encountered other variations of this “20 percent success rule” in reports and academic papers implying that the generic producer or distributor—large corporations and small independent companies alike—can survive or build fortunes thanks to the success of a few lucky projects. However, Hollywood accounting is known to be creative,[12] employing contractually defined notions of net profit[13] that can be very different from the generally accepted accounting principles applied in other sectors.[14] As explained in this article, although the definition of net profits can vary from distributor to distributor (and from contract to contract), all of the existing versions seem to share a common rationale: the most significant degree of bargaining power generates a surplus for the most significant stakeholders, even when a motion picture officially does not make a net profit.

Therefore, a more careful examination of the notion of profit used in the formulation of the 20 percent success rule is important for understanding what this commonly-accepted statement actually reveals about the financial risk of filmmaking. De Vany and Walls define the net profit of a motion picture in admittedly simple terms: as the difference between the film rentals (i.e., the share of theatrical ticket sales that is fed back to the distributor) from the United States and Canadian markets minus the production costs of the movie.[15] Therefore, the 20 percent success rule seems to suggest that only (about) one in five motion pictures earned enough from the first exhibition window to cover the costs of production. Furthermore, among this small percentage of motion pictures, there is a small collection of very fortunate projects that generate incomes much larger than their costs. What the 20 percent success rule does not explain is how many motion pictures released generate a positive return after having exploited all the opportunities available and how that income is distributed between the stakeholders.

In addition to theatrical release in the US and Canada, Hollywood motion picture revenue also includes film rentals from theatrical release in international markets as well as income from secondary and ancillary windows. Moreover, the distributors that commonly produce or coproduce a motion picture also manage the film’s exploitation in the first and subsequent windows. They normally take most of the risks associated with the production and release of a motion picture, and hence are the stakeholders claiming the largest share of its revenue. Furthermore, the distributors that are part of the six major info-entertainment conglomerates directly control the exploitation of motion pictures in different windows through a network of fully-owned subsidiaries (e.g., Comcast, NewsCorp, Disney, Viacom, Time Warner, and Sony Corp.). The income generated by a motion picture in secondary and ancillary markets is nowadays so important (up to 80 percent) that the primary activity of the major distributors is to manage intellectual properties to create synergies between the different windows of exploitation.[16] Therefore, the high level of uncertainty that once characterized the return from the theatrical release does not affect the choice of content or, more generally, the business strategy of the major distributors as it did before the expansion of secondary and ancillary markets.

This study attempts to critically review the 20 percent success rule and to question the commonly accepted belief that the business strategy of the media conglomerates is highly influenced by the volatile market conditions that may characterize the theatrical release. In order to reach this objective, it calculates the success rate of a slate of motion pictures distributed in 2007 by the majors and their subsidiaries. These success rates take into account revenue estimates realized in (most of) the secondary windows and are calculated from the viewpoint of the producers and conglomerates.

The year 2007 was chosen because it is the most recent annual span for which data concerning secondary markets revenue was publicly released.[17] In order to reach its objectives, this article draws from specialized websites[18] and from information (such as distributors’ fees and cost of prints) documented by a variety of experts about the most common practices employed by key stakeholders of the motion picture industry.[19]

Methodology and Assumptions

The dataset used for this analysis was built by collecting data about 191 motion pictures released in 2007 by mainstream distributors and specialty labels affiliated with the six largest info-entertainment conglomerates, which at that time were Time Warner (abbreviated “TWX”), Walt Disney (DIS), News Corporation (NWS), NBC Universal (NBCU), Paramount (now Viacom, VIA), and Sony (SNE) (see Table 3).[21] The data taken from online databases are referred to here as the “imported variables” (listed in Table 1 and marked in the formulae with the sign “*”), a term chosen in order to distinguish them from the “computed variables” estimated by the author (see Table 2).[22]

Finally, imported variables and computed variables are used to calculate success rates: the percentages of motion pictures of the total sample (but also of each distributor and of each conglomerate) that are likely to have generated a positive return. These success rates are based on two notions of profits: the net profits (or losses) of a motion picture—from the viewpoint of the producers—and the profits (or losses) of a motion picture from the viewpoint of the conglomerates. The most important difference between these two notions is that, in the case of the former, the fees paid to the distributors before the calculation of profits are assumed to be expenses paid to a third party, while in the case of the latter, these fees are replaced by the net margins generated by the distributors, as they are considered to be part of the same conglomerates of the studio coproducing the motion picture.

Moreover, instead of assuming specific, contractually-agreed conditions, the variables necessary to calculate the profit of different movies assume standardized conditions based on the most recurring practices as detailed by Epstein, by Ulin and by Wasko.[23] Although these three sources tend to converge, there are small differences between what they respectively indicate as the most common fees and costs; therefore, many methodological choices had to be made. Given the large number of these methodological choices, a sensitivity analysis of the variables used here would not help in assessing the consistency of the results provided. Instead, as detailed below, the decision was made to account for the potential effects of different methodological choices in the calculation of the success rates by using intervals.

Unfortunately, the imported variables DOMESTIC DVD SALES and US DVD RENTAL GROSS available (respectively) from The Numbers and Box Office Mojo do not provide observations for all of the 191 movies selected; indeed, some of the data concerning productions by specialty labels are missing. Therefore, the missing observations were estimated using the coefficients obtained by two multiple linear regressions based on two subsets of the database containing the (complete) data of motion pictures of similar scope.[24] As such, variable I. ESTIMATES OF DOMESTIC DVD SALES was explained by the DOMESTIC TOTAL GROSS BOX OFFICE and the widest release (i.e., the maximum number of theaters in which the movie is shown at the same time), while the revenue from variable II. ESTIMATES OF HOME VIDEO RENTALS was explained by the widest release and the COMPOSITE SCORE, a variable constructed to take into account users’ feedback and the potential of word-of-mouth advertising following the theatrical release.[25]

• (I.) ESTIMATES OF DOMESTIC DVD SALES
• • = 0.35 × BOX OFFICE, DOMESTIC TOTAL GROSS* + 4435.64 × WIDEST RELEASE*
•  [multiple R2 = 89.1%; R2 = 79.5%; R2 (ADJ) = 76.1%]
• (II.) ESTIMATES OF HOME VIDEO RENTALS
• • = 9153.21 × WIDEST RELEASE* + 149107.69 × COMPOSITE SCORE
•  [multiple R2 = 89.8%; R2 = 80.6%; R2 (ADJ) = 78.5%]

Conclusion

This article illustrates that more than 70 percent of motion pictures distributed in 2007 by the six largest media conglomerates are likely to have generated a positive return for the producers, if the revenue from the secondary windows is taken into account. Such a statement remains valid even for films producing a rate of return of 30 percent or more and those producing a loss of 30 percent or more (i.e., only 68 percent of the sample). Furthermore, the ratio of motion pictures likely to have generated a positive return goes up to 90 percent if net income generated by the different distribution branches involved is also taken into account (see the Total line in Table 3). The estimates also indicate that the 36 motion pictures that saw a negative rate of return from the point of view of the producers are nonetheless likely to generate a profit for the conglomerate. This occurred despite the fact that poor performance in the theatrical window has a negative influence on the performance of the film in the following ones. Examples include El cantante (2007, distributed by TWX) and Evan Almighty (2007, by NBCU).

These calculations also confirm that the specialized distributors undertook projects that were more original and riskier than the ones produced and distributed by the mainstream labels.[60] Apart from the results of Fox Searchlight and Warner Independent, the rate of success in 2007 of these minor labels tended to be lower than the mainstream labels of the same conglomerate.

It must be stressed, however, that these calculations rely heavily on a large number of methodological choices. Simply put, a standard and most recurring case scenario of fees and costs was constructed and applied to a dataset of revenue streams, which also had to be partially completed by estimates of data and series. This standardized framework of agreements between different stakeholders is used to approximate a world of complex contracts, sometimes resulting from lengthy negotiations. However, the point of this exercise is not to introduce a new rule and to replace 20 percent with 70 percent. As explained above, the belief that the stakeholders of the motion picture industry operate in highly uncertain market conditions is widely assumed even though it is not justified or supported by calculations of success rates that consider the total exploitation cycle of motion pictures across various platforms and ancillary markets. Therefore, the purpose of this exercise is to assess whether the 20 percent success rule still applies to motion pictures distributed by the majors in this new environment. The estimates provided indicate that this is unlikely to be the case.

The consequences of the 20 percent success rule should not be underestimated. The shared assumption that market conditions are risky works in favor of the majors, when they negotiate with potential partners, while also allowing them to lobby for stricter copyright protections, as well as to argue in favor of conglomeration in the media industries. Notably, if policy makers accept that the financial outcome of a movie is highly unpredictable, they are also more inclined to accept capital concentration in this sector as a way to reduce risk and encourage investment. In a situation characterized by low rates of success, it is argued that large media conglomerates are the only ones able to deliver a slate of motion pictures that contains enough successful titles to make the company financially viable.

Such an assumption leads to vertical integration in the media sector that in turn increases the bargaining power of film distributors that are divisions of the largest conglomerates. This both ensures their profitability and undermines the business conditions faced by small producers and distributors. These industry participants must accept the conditions imposed by the majors, including paying large fees for distribution and collecting a relatively small share of revenue from the secondary markets. Therefore, the 20 percent success rule is a pernicious narrative that in numerous ways serves the interests of major conglomerates, quite likely at the expense of filmmakers, audiences, and public policy.

1. Sergio Sparviero is Assistant Professor at Paris Lodron University of Salzburg, Institute of Communication Studies (Fachbereich Kommunikationswissenschaft). He teaches courses in media economics, Hollywood economics, media innovations, and creative industries. His research interests range from alternative economic theories to the effects of the digitization of media content on various media industries, including audiovisual media, music, and news. He is a member of the International Association of Media and Communication Research (IAMCR) and of the European Communication and Research Education Association (ECREA).

2. The author would like to thank Michael Curtin, Ricard Parrilla Guix, and the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions, and Anna Bramböck, Holger Weiss, and Friederike Zuber-Goos for their assistance.

3. Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: Knopf, 2011), 217-218.

4. Ibid., 218.

5. Edward Jay Epstein, The Hollywood Economist: The Hidden Financial Reality Behind the Movies (Hoboken, NJ: Melville House, 2010); Jeff Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution: Monetizing Film, TV, and Video Content in an Online World (Burlington, MA: Focal, 2009).

6. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist.

7. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 5.

8. The history and a description of the current strategy of the Hollywood Majors is informed by sections of the following writings: Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution; Janet Wasko, How Hollywood Works (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003); Wu, The Master Switch; Epstein, The Hollywood Economist; Jason E. Squire, ed., The Movie Business Book (3rd ed.; Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: Open University Press, 2006); and Sergio Sparviero, “The Creative Destruction of the United States' Audio-Visual Media Ecosystem,” in International Perspectives on Business Innovation and Disruption in the Creative Industries: Film, Video, Photography, ed. Patrik Wikstrom and Robert DeFillippi (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014).

9. Mark Weinstein, “Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood: Evolution and Analysis,” Journal of Legal Studies 27, no. 1 (1998): 67-112.

10. United Nations, Creative Economy Report 2008: The Challenge of Assessing the Creative Economy Towards Informed Policy-Making (New York: United Nations, 2008), 63.

11. Arthur S. De Vany and W. David Walls, “Motion Picture Profit, the Stable Paretian Hypothesis, and the Curse of the Superstar,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, no. 6 (2004): 1039, emphasis added.

12. Wasko, How Hollywood Works, 99-101.

13. Weinstein, “Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood,” 68.

14. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution; Wasko, How Hollywood Works.

15. Arthur S. De Vany and W. David Walls, “Uncertainty in the Movie Industry: Does Star Power Reduce the Terror of the Box Office?,” Journal of Cultural Economics 23, no. 4 (1999): 285-318, De Vany and Walls, “Motion Picture Profit.”

16. See Epstein, The Hollywood Economist; Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution; Wasko, How Hollywood Works.

17. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist, 180.

18. Such as The Numbers(http://www.the-numbers.com/) and Box Office Mojo(http://www.boxofficemojo.com/).

19. i.e. in Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution; Wasko, How Hollywood Works; Steven E. Blume, “The Revenue Streams: An Overview,” in The Movie Business Book, ed. Jason E. Squire (3rd ed.; Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: Open University Press, 2006), 332-61; Epstein, The Hollywood Economist.

20. Here domestic refers only to the United States.

21. Note that the list of movies was mainly generated from the data delivered by the www.the-numbers.com. The Numbers.com list of movies released in 2007 by the distributors mentioned is 187. From information collected from other sources, the following movies were added: La Vie en Rose, The Orphanage (Picturehouse, TWX), In the Valley of Elah, December Boys (Warner Independent, TWX), Perfume: The Story of a Murderer (Paramount Pictures, VIA). The Last Sin Eater (Twentieth Century Fox, NWSA) was not included because of lack of data. According to The Numbers, the total domestic theatrical box office was $9,629,223,928. The total box office for the sample of movies analyzed was $8,735,242,714 (about 90 percent). The total number of motion pictures released in 2007 was 610; the sample analyzed only includes about 60 percent of them.

22. Unfortunately, the primary sources of the data delivered by Box Office Mojo and The Numbers were not revealed. However, given the lack of alternative sources, these websites are commonly used as sources of information for academic research. Some examples of academic papers that draw information from one or both these websites include: Sang Ho Kim, Namkee Park, and Seung Hyun Park, “Exploring the Effects of Online Word of Mouth and Expert Reviews on Theatrical Movies‘ Box Office Success,” Journal of Media Economics 26, no. 2 (2013): 98-114; Holger Roschk and Sebastian Große, “Talking About Films: Word-of-Mouth Behavior and the Network of Success Determinants of Motion Pictures,” Journal of Promotion Management 19, no. 3 (2013): 299-316; Hyejin Yoon and Edward J. Malecki, “Cartoon Planet: Worlds of Production and Global Production Networks in the Animation Industry,” Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 1 (2010): 239-71.

23. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist; Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution; Wasko, How Hollywood Works.

24. These data (sub)sets contain only fifty-nine observations for home video rentals and thirty-eight for domestic DVD sales.

25. The latter is an indicator calculated using the ratings of the movie as they are published on Rotten Tomatoes, IMDB and Metacritic as explained in more detail in Sergio Sparviero, “The Business Strategy of Hollywood's Most Powerful Distributors: An Empirical Analysis,” Observatorio (OBS*) 7, no. 4 (2013): 45-62.

26. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist; Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution; Wasko, How Hollywood Works.

27. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 434.

28. Wasko, How Hollywood Works; Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution. Wasko also explains that 50 percent of the box office is likely to be an underestimation of the film rentals.

29. Blume, “The Revenue Streams: An Overview,” 338.

30. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist, 151.; Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 441.

31. Indeed, even though a description of the methodology is not publicly available, the revenue of the latest movies released on DVD is seemingly based on a price of about $15 per unit, i.e., the price at which the DVD is available on Amazon.com (at the time of writing).

32. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 181.

33. Ibid., 204.

34. Ross Johnson, “Video Sales Abroad Are Good News in Hollywood. Shhh.” New York Times, January 31, 2005.

35. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 268.

36. Ibid., 236-237.

37. As mentioned above, there are contracts that include a share of the advertising revenues, although these are seemingly relatively rare. Ibid.

38. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist, 180.

39. Ibid., 180.

40. Edward Jay Epstein, “Hollywood's Profits, Demystified,” Slate, August 8, 2005.

41. Note that the declared production budget figures for 28 of the 191 films of the sample were not available from any other sources used and were estimated using the same methodology applied in Sparviero, “The Business Strategy of Hollywood's Most Powerful Distributors.” These estimates are based on a comparison with another movie, which had a similar opening weekend, quantified in the number of screens. The choice of this last indicator as a proxy for the production budget is informed by the fact that efforts to promote a motion picture are normally proportional to its total cost (see, for example, Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution). These twenty-eight films are either small productions (e.g., documentaries), or films that were relatively poorly rated by their audiences.

42. Josh Friedman and Lorenza Munoz, “Universal Prays Amid Weak Launch for ‘Evan,’” Los Angeles Times, June 25, 2007.

43. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 453.

44. Wasko, How Hollywood Works, 96.

45. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 450.; Wasko, How Hollywood Works, 88.

46. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 450; Wasko, How Hollywood Works, 96.

47. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 450.

48. Ibid., 445; Wasko, How Hollywood Works, 92.

49. Such an assumption is likely to produce an underestimation of the rate of successful movies. Conglomerates normally own more than 50 percent of their franchise movies, which are likely to be the most profitable, while losses in general are likely to be borne by conglomerates as well as other stakeholders. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution.

50. Ibid., 442.

51. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution. Also note that Wasko contends that the amounts due as sales tax are assumed to be included in the distribution fees. Income tax and subsidies are not included in the calculations because of a lack of information.

52. According to Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution.

53. Ibid., 145.

54. Ibid., 127.

55. Ibid., 145.

56. Ibid. In The Hollywood Economist, Epstein also suggests that the average cost of a print is $1,500, but he indicates that the cost of an opening weekend is about $6 million, calculated for four thousand screens, although he fails to mention for which type of movies.

57. Motion Picture Association of America, 2011 Theatrical Market Statistics; Motion Picture Association of America, 2012 Theatrical Market Statistics.

58. Epstein, The Hollywood Economist, 125.

59. Ulin, The Business of Media Distribution, 213.

60. See for example, Sparviero, “The Business Strategy of Hollywood's Most Powerful Distributors: An Empirical Analysis.”

Bibliography

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• De Vany, Arthur S., and W. David Walls. “Motion Picture Profit, the Stable Paretian Hypothesis, and the Curse of the Superstar.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, no. 6 (2004): 1035-57.
• ———. “Uncertainty in the Movie Industry: Does Star Power Reduce the Terror of the Box Office?” Journal of Cultural Economics 23, no. 4 (1999): 285-318.
• Epstein, Edward Jay. The Hollywood Economist: The Hidden Financial Reality Behind the Movies. Hoboken, NJ: Melville House, 2010.
• ———. “Hollywood's Profits, Demystified.”Slate, August 8, 2005.
• Friedman, Josh, and Lorenza Munoz. “Universal Prays Amid Weak Launch for ‘Evan.’”Los Angeles Times, June 25, 2007.
• Johnson, Ross. “Video Sales Abroad are Good News in Hollywood. Shhh.”New York Times, January 31, 2005.
• Kim, Sang Ho, Namkee Park, and Seung Hyun Park. “Exploring the Effects of Online Word of Mouth and Expert Reviews on Theatrical Movies‘ Box Office Success.” Journal of Media Economics 26, no. 2 (2013): 98-114.
• Motion Picture Association of America. 2011 Theatrical Market Statistics. Last modified February 2012. http://www.mpaa.org.
• ———. 2012 Theatrical Market Statistics. Last modified March 2013. http://www.mpaa.org.
• Roschk, Holger, and Sebastian Grosse. “Talking about Films: Word-of-Mouth Behavior and the Network of Success Determinants of Motion Pictures.” Journal of Promotion Management 19, no. 3 (2013): 299-316.
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• ———. “The Creative Destruction of the United States' Audio-Visual Media Ecosystem.” In International Perspectives on Business Innovation and Disruption in the Creative Industries: Film, Video, Photography, edited by Patrik Wikstrom and Robert DeFillippi, 128-148. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014.
• Squire, Jason E., ed. The Movie Business Book. 3rd ed. Maidenhead, Berkshire, England: Open University Press, 2006.
• Ulin, Jeff. The Business of Media Distribution: Monetizing Film, TV and Video Content in an Online World. Burlington, MA: Focal, 2009.
• United Nations. Creative Economy Report 2008: The Challenge of Assessing the Creative Economy Towards Informed Policy-Making. New York: United Nations, 2008.
• Wasko, Janet. How Hollywood Works. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003.
• Weinstein, Mark. “Profit-Sharing Contracts in Hollywood: Evolution and Analysis.” Journal of Legal Studies 27, no. 1 (1998): 67-112.
• Wu, Tim. The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. New York: Knopf, 2011.
• Yoon, Hyejin, and Edward J. Malecki. “Cartoon Planet: Worlds of Production and Global Production Networks in the Animation Industry.” Industrial and Corporate Change 19, no. 1 (2010): 239-71.

Copyright © 2015 (Sergio Sparviero). Media Industries is an open-access, peer-reviewed, online academic journal. As such, we aim to participate in the open exchange of information. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial No Derivatives (by-nc-nd) License. Under this license, this work is available for sharing and noncommercial distribution provided the appropriate attribution is given.